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Hursh: The Status of Visitors in the National Parks Located in Wyoming -

THE STATUS OF VISITORS IN THE NATIONAL
PARKS LOCATED IN WYOMING--FEDERAL
LIABILITY UNDER CURRENT APPLICABLE
WYOMING LAW
During the year 1966, visitation to the National Parks located in Wyoming continued to show an increase.' As a consequence of the increasing traffic, there was a corresponding
increase in the number of personal injuries incurred while
the visitors were within the Park boundaries. In 1966 there
were 177 non-motor vehicle accidents in Grand Teton National
Park while in Yellowstone 197 were reported. In both Parks,
falls accounted for the majority of the reported injuries. In
Yellowstone, 68 of the 197 injuries were inflicted by bears.2
Nevertheless, in Grand Teton no tort claims based on such
injuries were filed, while in Yellowstone, only two claims
were filed 3 Yellowstone had a half million fewer visitors, but
reported 40% more personal injuries. This higher percentage is attributed to the existence in Yellowstone of the seemingly friendly but dangerous wild animals. With respect to
the tort claims filed, the instances of recovery by the Park
visitor have been limited.
This comment will analyze the status of the visitor in
Wyoming's National Parks in the context of those injuries
arising from non-motor vehicle accidents placing special emphasis on the dangerous animal problem in Yellowstone.
In the determination of liability for negligence, persons
coming on the premises of another are ordinarily classified
as either trespassers, licensees or invitees, with such classifiAn example of increased visitation is found in the following statistics from
Yellowstone National Park: 1964-1,929,316; 1965-2,062,476, and in 1966
Between 1965 and 1966, .67,837 more visitors entered that
-2,130,318.
Park, and over the two year period from 1964 to 1966, the increase totals
200,997.
2. In Grand Teton 80% of the injuries other than motor vehicle which were
reported were attributable to falls, while in Yellowstone the figure approximates nearly 45% of the total.
3. In considering the validity of the number of tort claims filed it must be
noted that the Statute of Limitations is three years and some claims from
1966 have not as yet been filed. The figures for 1965 would have more
validity in this context, and in Yellowstone for that year three claims
have been filed from bear injury or damage, three from falls, and eight
from motor vehicle accidents.
4. These figures, as well as those statistics and percentages used in notes 1-3
above, were furnished by the Park Headquarters Offices in Grand Teton
and Yellowstone National Park through the efforts and cooperation of
Mr. Claude W. McClain, Chief Ranger and Mr. Duane Graf, Assistant
Chief Park Ranger in Grand Teton National Park; and Mr. Edward Widmer, Law Enforcement Officer in Yellowstone National Park.
1.
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cation being of primary importance in fixing the duty of care
which must be exercised.' For the purposes of determining
status of the visitors, the current law of Wyoming is applicable to anyone injured while within the boundaries of Grand
Teton and Yellowstone National Parks.' The problem of the
Park visitor's status is determined by the Wyoming court's
distinctions with reference to the licensee and invitee; the
duty of care required; the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk; the Wyoming statutory provision; and the effects of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
INVITEE STATUS AND DUTY OF CARE

In the recent case of Ashley v. United States,7 decided in
1963 by the United States District Court of Nebraska, Wyoming law was applied to determine the status of the visitor.
In Ashley a Park visitor, while traveling with his family
through Yellowstone National Park, was bitten on the arm
by a bear. The visitor was asleep at the time of injury and had
his arm resting on the rim of an open automobile window.
The court determined the visitor's status to be that of an invitee under Wyoming law and held that the injury was not
proximately attributable to the government's failure to exercise ordinary care.' In the Ashley decision the court discussed significant issues relating to the status and the duty of
care applicable to a park visitor; the rule of absolute liability
as it may apply to the harboring of dangerous animals in the
parks; proximate cause; and the possible application of the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
To determine the status of the visitor, the court in Ashley
cited the Wyoming case of Loney v. Laramie Auto Co.,' de5. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(1) (1966).
6. Federal Tort Claims Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 1346(b), 62 Stat. 933;
as amended, April 25, 1949, c. 92, § 2 (a), 63 Stat. 62; as amended, May
24, 1949, c. 139, § 80 (a), (b), 63 Stat. 101; as amended, October 31, 1951,
c. 655, § 50 (b), 65 Stat. 727; as amended July 30, 1954, c. 648, § 1, 68
Stat. 589; as amended July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-508, § 12 (e), 72 Stat. 348,
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964) Act of February 1, 1928, c. 15, 45 Stat. 54, 16 U.S.C.
§ 457 (1964).
7. 215 F. Supp. 39 (D.C. Neb. 1963), affd per curiam, 326 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.
1964). See also Recent Decisions, 24 MD. L. REv. 222 (1964); Recent
Decisions, 15 SYRACUSe L. REv. 131 (1963).
8. Prior to the Ashley case the Department of the Interior considered the
visitor in the National Parks located in Wyoming to be a licensee. Claim
of Mrs. Kathryn L. Rogers, 63 Interior Dec. 150 (1956).
9. 86 Wyo. 889, 255 P. 350 (1927).
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cided in 1927. The latter decision distinguished an invitee from
a licensee when the plaintiff-passenger was injured in the defendant's garage while watching a repairman fix a flat tire
on the driver's automobile. The court rejected the defendant's
contention that the passenger was a licensee and found that
the injured party enjoyed invitee status on the basis that he
was acting as an agent for the owner of the automobile. The
court also indicated that the duty of care owed to an invitee
was to keep the premises reasonably safe and to warn of any
hidden dangers. On the other hand, it indicated that a licensee must only be warned of a trap upon the premises.
In 1948 the case of Dudley v. Montgomery Ward"° expanded the invitee distinction by the court's recognition and approval of the Ohio case of J. C. Penny Co. v. Robinson." In
Dudley the court said:
When he (the owner or lessee) expressly or by implication invites others to come upon his premises,
whether for business or any other purpose, it is his
duty to be reasonably sure that he is not inviting them
into danger, and to that end he must exercise ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably safe for the visit.'"
This distinction with the critical words "whether for business
or any other purposes" combined with the sole requirement
18
of an invitation was also approved in Honan v. Moss. In
this case, an action was brought by a customer's guest who
fell into an open grease pit while looking for a restroom in
a service station. In Ashley, the rule stated in Dudley and
Honan was cited as the applicable Wyoming criterion from
which the court determined that a park visitor was an invitee.
Generally, two theories are used to determine an invitee
classification. The older theory is the "invitation" theory
and is contrasted with the more strict "economic benefit"
approach.' In both Loney and Honan, the Wyoming Supreme Court clearly adopted the "invitation" theory which
is derived from the early English case of Intermaur v.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

64 Wyo. 357, 192 P.2d 617 (1948).
128 Ohio St. 626, 193 N.E. 401 (1934).
2 COOLEY, TORTs § 1259 (3d ed. 1906).
359 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 1961).
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(41) (1966); PROSSER, TORTS § 61 (3d ed. 1965);
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.12 (1956); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d. 986-992

(1964).
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Dames.15 Under this approach the existence of an express or
implied invitation to come upon one's premises will designate
any person so accepting the invitation as an invitee. The invitation theory is now followed by a great majority of American jurisdictions."6
The court in Ashley could have benefited by the use of
the public invitee theory. The Restatement of Torts (Second)
has now recognized the existence of the public invitee which
is defined as a person who is invited to enter on land which
is held open to the public. 7 As early as 1925, the Wyoming
5 recognized the princourt in Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne"
ciple of a public invitee in the context of a child on a public
playground. There is even stronger support for the public
invitee distinction where a public entity is involved as is illustrated in jurisdictions other than Wyoming." In the Virginia case of City of Richmond v. Grizzard," the court stated
that when the status depends upon an implied invitation, the
visitor is an invitee if the premises are open to the public and
the visitor enters pursuant to the purposes for which they
are open. The New York Court in Caldwell v. Village of Island
Park," conferred public invitee status upon those accepting
an implied invitation to enter upon governmental premises.
The court held that a municipality which extends to its citizens an invitation to enter and use recreational areas owes
to those accepting the invitation a duty of reasonable and ordinary care against foreseeable dangers. The court further
held that it is not a prerequisite for the imposition of these
duties that the municipality charge an admission fee.
Illustrative of the public invitee in federal jurisdictions
is Smith v. United States," where the plaintiff was injured
by a falling tree limb in a United States Forest Service campground located in California. The court found that there was
both an express invitation, in the form of a Department of
Agriculture Booklet inviting public use, and an implied invi15. L.R. 1 C. P. 274, 287 (1866).
16. PROSSER, TORTS § 61 (3d ed. 1965).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
18. 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710 (1925).
19. See also Fuchs v. Mapes, 74 Nev. 366, 332 P.2d 1002 (1958); Dowd v.
Portsmouth Hospital, 105 N.H. 53, 193 A.2d 788 (1963); Schlicht v. Thesing,
25 Wis. 2d 436, 130 N.W.2d 763 (1964).
20. 205 Va. 298, 136 S.E.2d 827 (1964).
21. 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
22. 117 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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tation by the mere setting aside of a particular campsite in a
National Forest. In Smith no fee was charged by the Forest
Service for the use of the campground. The court in Ashley
stated that the fact that an entry fee was charged was not 'determinative of invitee status. The Restatement " notes that
where land is held open to the public, it is immaterial that
the visitor does not pay for his admission.2"
By the very purpose and function of the National Park
Service, an express invitation is extended to the public to use
the Parks." Wyoming law, which follows the invitation
theory, clearly indicates that a visitor injured within the
boundaries of a National Park located in Wyoming will be
a public invitee.2"
It is to be noted that the visitor may lose his invitee status if he exceeds the scope of the invitation. If entry is made
into a restricted or closed area, trail, or road of the Park, he
would then become a licensee if the entry was made with the
consent of the Park Service. If no consent was given, the visitor would be a mere trespasser." In Honan the court indicated that the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct is the
criterion for determining if status changes from an invitee to
a licensee. The court stated that "the trier of fact may infer
an invitation extends to those parts of the premises on or in
which an invitee naturally or reasonably would go." 8
We have previously noted that, according to the Loney
and Dudley decisions, the Wyoming court defines the duty
owed an invitee to be that of ordinary care and prudence in
rendering the premises reasonably safe and to warn of any
hidden dangers. In Fisher v. Robbins," the court indicated,
however, that a higher duty of care might be imposed on those
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332, comment d (1965).
For state court decisions following the RESTATEMENT rule, see 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 63(41) (1966).
The purpose and function of the National Park Service is set forth in 16
U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
In Williams v. United States, unreported, (E.D. Mich. 1961) the plaintiff
was a temporary employee of an independent contractor in Glacier National
Park and the court designated him as an invitee.
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(48) (1966); PROSSER, TORTS § 61 (3d ed. 1965);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332, comment c (1965).
In the Claim of Mrs. Hannah Cohen, 70 Interior Dec. 188 (1963), the
Department of the Interior has recognized the invitee status of a park
visitor under Wyoming law and has overruled the finding of a licensee in
the Claim of Mrs. Kathryn L. Rogers, supra note 8.
78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957).
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who maintain places for public patronage. Fisher involved a
business invitee and the court apparently limited the higher
duty of care to those classes of public use where experience
has shown violent disturbances are most likely to occur, such
as in a barroom. The plaintiff in Ashley asserted the higher
'duty of Fisher, but the court rejected the contention. The
Loney and Honan cases, therefore, stand today as the applicable Wyoming law with respect to the duty of care owed to the
park visitor and to invitees in general."
The duty to warn of danger is critical in relation to two
aspects of the operation of the Parks: the distribution of
information at the entrance stations; and, the individual disclosure functions carried on by the Park personnel. When
the visitor enters a National Park he is given an informational
booklet. Included within this booklet, especially in Yellowstone, is a special "animal warning insert" which denotes
the existence of dangerous animals and contains specific
warnings not to feed or molest them. The visitor is also cautioned to remain in his vehicle anrd to take pictures with vehicle windows closed. Included within the booklet are specific
warnings to stay on the established trails and boardwalks
when observing hydrothermal and other geological features
of the Parks. At each entrance station in Yellowstone the Park
Service has erected large roadside warning signs to this same
effect.
In Ashley the plaintiff contented that the failure to tell
30. The Department of the Interior has noted:
Of course, any comparison of the legal status of visitors to Federal
property in the various states must be made with caution since the
difference in the facts of the cases make any direct comparison difficult. The following are examples of how visitors to Federal property
have been classified in other jurisdictions. In the District of Columbia
the ordinary visitor is considered a licensee by invitation. Firfer v.
United States, 208 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (Jefferson Memorial);
Martin v. United States, 226 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Washington
Monument). In McNamara v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.
1951 (Capital Building); Judge Holtzoff states: "Under the law of the
District of Columbia a sightseer in a public building is not an invitee but
is a licensee by invitation." The McNamara case is of particular interest
since Judge Holtzoff while sitting in the Southern District of California
in Peets v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 177 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (Fort Ord,
Cal., Cafeteria), considered a visitor at Fort Ord, California, to be an
invitee where plaintiffs visited their son stationed there while in military service. In Smith v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Cal.
1953) (Los Padres National Forest), the camper was also held to be
an invitee. However, a would-be hunter in Chinca v. United States, 190
F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (Shasta National Forest), was considered
by the court as a licensee.
70 Interior Dec. 188, 190 n.5 (1963).
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him to keep his vehicle windows rolled up and of the danger
of an unprovoked attack was a violation of the duty to warn
an invitee of danger. 1 The court rejected these contentions,
stating that this went beyond the duty of care required of
the Park Service. Judge Van Pelt in his opinion stated, "Experience has undoubtedly taught the Park personnel that
such a warning given on a nice day such as the one on which
plaintiff was injured, would fall on deaf ears. Were the Park
Service to attempt by regulation to force visitors to take such
a precaution, enforcement would, as a practical matter, be
impossible." 2 Yet the Park Service, particularly in Yellowstone, has undertaken every possible and practical method
of warning the visitor of the dangers inherent in that Park
and of the precautions to be taken for his own safety.
Once the visitor has entered the Park there is a high
probability that he will inquire of a Ranger as to any number of topics of general curiosity or specific information. A
resultant negligent disclosure by the individual Park employee
is another area where liability for injury can arise. The most
significant case on this point is Claypool v. United States"
decided in 1951. In Claypool the plaintiff asked a Park Ranger about the safety of sleeping in a tent in the Old Faithful
campground. The Ranger, even though he had a reasonable
belief to the contrary, replied that the visitor would be safe,
that hundreds of people did it every night and that bears
never attacked unless provoked or the campers had food located in the area. Relying on this information, the plaintiff
slept in his tent and was injured by a bear. The court, after
discussing the distinctions between invitees, licensees, and
gratuitous licensees under Wyoming law, found that it was
unnecessary to determine the status of the plaintiff in as
much as the liability was predicated upon a negligent statement of false information by an individual Ranger acting
within the scope of his employment. The court imposed a
strict duty upon the disclosure and informational functions
of the Ranger personnel.
31. At the time of the Ashley case the Yellowstone informational booklet given
to the visitor did not specify that vehicle windows should be closed while
in the vicinity of dangerous animals. A specific warning to this effect
is now included in the animal warning inserts given to each visitor as
he enters Yellowstone.
32. Ashley v. United States, supra note 7, at 47.
33. 98 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
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In Ashley the plaintiff asserted the stricter liability imposed in Claypool on the theory that the ommission in the warning literature was a violation of the duty to make an adequate
disclosure or warning. The court noted with approval the result in Claypool if the negligent disclosure is made by an individual Park employee, but refused to extend the principle to the general warnings given the visitor by the Park
Service upon entrance into the Parks.
It is evident that two standards have developed relative to
the duty of care: (1) that the invitee status and the duty
of care owed to the invitee is relevant when considering the
general duty of the Park Service to warn of danger and to
keep the premises reasonably safe; and (2) even if the general
'duty of care has been satisfied, a negligent disclosure of information by an individual Park employee acting within the
scope of his employment, after an inquiry by a visitor, will
lead directly to the liability question without a consideration
of the invitee status."
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION UNDER

THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIms ACT

It is important to note that liability is not imposed for
the performance of functions which are found to be discretionary within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act."5
The court in Ashley applied this exclusion when considering
plaintiff's contention that the premises were not kept in a
safe condition because of the presence of a known dangerous animal. The court cited Dalehitev. United States"5 where,
in discussing Section 2680 of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7
the United States Supreme Court said, "It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations
It is interesting to note the extent to which the distinction was carried in
Williams v. United States, supra note 26, where the government was held
liable upon the negligent disclosure by a manager of an independent contractor to an employee. The court imputed the manager's negligent disclosure to the government on the theory of apparent authority and indicated
that a higher duty of care of disclosure is owed to those using the Park's
trails.
35. Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 2680 (a), 62 Stat. 984; July 16, 1949, c. 340,
63 Stat. 444; Sept. 26, 1950, c. 1049, §§ 2 (a) (2), 13 (5), 64 Stat. 1038,
1043; August 18, 1959, Pub. L. 86-168, Title II, § 202 (b), 73 Stat. 389,
28 U.S.C. 2680 (a) (1964).
36. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
37. Supra note 35.

34.
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of the government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable." 38 The Ashley court held that the handling
of troublesome roadside bears was in the nature of a discretionary function especially if the policy of control had
been instituted at the District Ranger level. The court justified this holding on the basis that a good 'deal of discretion
is involved not only in formulating a policy which balances
the safety of visitors and employees in a National Park and
the preservation of the wild animals in their natural state for
the benefit of the public, but also in the making of the decisions pursuant to that policy. It appears that, in the context
of animal control, the exclusion of liability for the performance of a discretionary function bars the contention of a
visitor that because of the existence of these animals the premises were inherently dangerous to him and as such violates
the duty of care owed to him as an invitee.
DEFENSES AvAiLABLE

To THE

GOVERNMENT

There remains to be considered the defenses available to
the government in an action brought by an injured Park
visitor. The defense relating to the exercise of a discretionary
function has been noted, but contributory negligence and
assumption of risk remain undecided issues. These defenses
were raised in Ashley but the court declined to consider them
after finding the element of proximate cause was missing
in the plaintiff's action. In Claypool, assumption of risk was
asserted by the government but the court ruled that due to
the lack of information in the Park brochures and the negligent disclosure by the Ranger, the risk was a concealed one
and that the plaintiff, not knowing of a risk, could not assuime one.
When applicable these defenses would again require an
examination of Wyoming law. In a conceptual context, Ford
Motor Corp. v. Arguello4" states that the distinctions be38. Dalehite v. United States, supra note 36, at 36.
39. It is conceivable that if the actual removal of a dangerous animal was
done in a negligent manner, the holding of Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), indicates that the government will be liable
if negligence occurs at the operational level. See also Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d
1047.
40. 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963). See also Rocky Mountain Trucking Co. v.
Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 336 P.2d 448, 451 (1959).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 2 [1967], Iss. 2, Art. 9

456

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. II

tween assumption of risk and contributory negligence have
not been adopted in Wyoming and the question of these defenses is not one of law except in the clearest cases. 1 The
Tenth Circuit recognized the Wyoming court's decision not
to distinguish between the two defenses and noted that "it
is enough that the instructions properly and fairly covered
the law of negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of risk.'"" It appears that the Wyoming court has chosen not to adopt any rules or formulations of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk and Honan indicates that
the question to be considered is the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's conduct.
Generally, the defenses would not be applicable if the
liability could be predicated upon those circumstances which
would lead to absolute liability. In Ashley the plaintiff asserted the rule that one who harbors or owns wild animals
will be absolutely liable for injuries incurred and that this
standard is applicable in the determination of the status of
the parties under Section 1346 (b) of the Federal Tort Claims
Act.4 The court rejected this contention and held that under
the Federal Tort Claims Act the United States cannot be
held to the standards of absolute liability.
In reference to the conduct of an invitee which will bar
recovery in-Wyoming, the court in Loney stated:
The Plaintiff, it is true was bound by what he
knew or might have known by the exercise of ordinary care. And if the danger, the peril, was known to
him because of his past knowledge, or if it was patent
and obvious, so that a man of ordinary prudence
should have known it, he :cannot recover."
This knowledge of danger is supplied to every Park visitor
in specific detail arid there is authority that one is guilty
of negligence if he exposes himself or his property to danger in disregard of warnings or notices when an ordinarily
prudent person similarly situated would have avoided the
danger."5 Further, conduct involving an undue risk of harm
41.
42.
43.
44.
46.

McDowell v. Walter%, 360 P.2d 166 (Wyo. 1961), rek. denied 361 P.2d 622;
Templar v. Tongate, 71 Wyo. 148, 255 P.2d 223 (1953) ; Borzea v. Anselmi,
71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 800 (1952).
Askin v. Delgarno, 293 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1961).
Supra note 2.
Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., supra note 9, at 853.
65A C.J.S. Negligence § 120(3) (1966).
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to the actor is contributory negligence. One who by his voluntary acts or omissions exposes himself to danger of which
he has actual or imputed knowledge is guilty of negligence,
if, under the same or similar circumstances an ordinarily
prudent person would not have incurred the risk of injury
which such conduct involved." These propositions are noted
to illustrate the strength of the defense which the government could assert in reference to those injuries incurred from
feeding and molesting the wild animals of the Parks. This
type of injury constitutes one of the most numerous of those
incurred by the visitors in Yellowstone. 7 In these situations
there could be a valid application of assumption of risk, which
generally requires knowledge, choice and an act or acquies48
cence.
The rule in Claypool as to the defense of assumption of
risk is based upon a reasonable distinction if the risk is indeed concealed. This is certainly revelant in the case of visitors coming to the Parks from areas where knowledge of the
dangers inherent in wilderness areas is not generally known.
Yet it is conceivable that this rule, if strictly construed, would
result in a fiction when applied to persons, such as those
from the bordering states of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming,
who are aware of the inherent danger involved.
Generally, if a negligent disclosure of information is
made by an individual Park employee acting within the scope
of his employment, the defense of assumption of risk would
fail, and it is equally difficult to apply the 'defense of contributory negligence in this context. However, those injuries
incurred from acts in disregard of the warnings of the Park
Service are vulnerable to both defenses as a bar to recovery
since the court must consider the reasonableness of the visitor's conduct.
APPLICABLE WYOMING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The duty of care owed to the Park visitor and the defenses available to an alleged breach of such duty must be
46. Id. at § 121.
47. Of the total of 197 individual injuries reported during 1966 in Yellowstone
National Park, 68 were attributed to bear injuries. This is second only
to falls as the most common source of injury in Yellowstone. Supra note 4.
48. 65A CJ.S. Negligence § 174(1) (1966).
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considered in light of Wyoming's recently enacted statute
concerning the liability imposed upon owners of land which
is used for recreational purposes.4" The statute provides that
an owner of land5" which is used for recreational purposes
does not
(1) extend any assurance that the premises are
safe for any purpose, (2) confer upon such person
that uses the land the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, and (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act or
omission of such person."
A recreational purpose as defined by the statute would embrace all of the activities of the visitors in the National Parks
located in Wyoming. 2
The statutory exclusion from liability is not applicable
in two situations, the second of which will limit its application in the National Parks.5 8 First, the statute will not apply
if there has been a willful or malicious failure to warn against
a dangerous condition on the premises. It is beyond question
that the Park Service's warnings are not willful and malicious failures as required by the statute. Second, the statute will not apply if a charge is levied on the persons entering the land for a recreational purpose. The term charge is defined as "the admission price or fee asked in return for an
invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land." 4 In
order to discuss the effect of the "charge provision," it is
relevant to note the fee structure of the National Park Service.
The National Park Service regulations are contained in
Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and, in general,
the fees ordinarily charged for entrance into the National
Parks are set forth in Section 6." Section 6.1 excludes certain individuals and groups from the fee requirements. The
49. WYo. STAT. §§ 34-389.1 to -389.6 (Comp. 1965).
50. An owner is defined as "the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee,
occupant or person in control of the premises." WYO. STAT. § 34-389.1(b)
(Comp. 1965).
51. WYO. STAT. § 34-389.3 (Comp. 1965).
52. WYO. STAT. § 34-389.1(c)

(Comp. 1965).

53. WYO. STAT. § 34-389.5(b)

(Comp. 1965).

54.

(Comp. 1965).

WYO. STAT. § 34-389.1(d)

55. 36 C.F.R. § 6 must be considered in conjunction with the provisions of
43 C.F.R. §§ 18.1-.12 (1966).
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entrance fees are not applicable to "vehicles institutionally
owned or chartered, carrying exclusively members of bona
fide educational institutions, when the trip to the area is officially initiated, organized and directed by such organizations for educational purposes." 56 In addition, entrance fees
are not applicable to children under 16 years of age and those
individuals traveling across areas where fees are charged to
reach residences located on private land.5 7 Further, the Park
Superintendent is given the authority to suspend the prescribed fees for seasonal periods if in the public interest."
The effect of the statute is such that (1) those visitors
who are not required to pay the entrance fee qualify under
the no-charge provision and as to them Federal Tort liability
is eliminated, and (2) the statute is not applicable to those
visitors who have paid the regular entrance fees and they will
be accorded the status of an invitee. In Ashley and Claypool
the court indicated that the payment of an entrance fee was
not determinative of the status of the visitor. Yet under the
Wyoming statute, the charge of an entrance fee becomes a
critical factor in the consideration of the status of the Park
visitor and the existence of any duty of care owed to him.
CONCLUSION

If a visitor to the National Parks located in Wyoming
pays an entrance fee and stays within the scope of his invitation, he is an invitee to whom the government owes the duty
to exercise ordinary care and prudence in rendering the premises safe and to warn of any danger. The general 'duty to
warn the visitor of danger has been fulfilled by the Park Service and any injuries resulting from disregard of these warnings can be effectively countered by the defense of contributory negligence combined with that of assumption of risk to
consider the reasonableness of the visitor's conduct. However,
if a negligent disclosure of known false information, upon
inquiry by a visitor, is made by a Park employee acting with56.

31 Fed. Reg. 251 (1966), amending 36 C.F.R. § 6.1 (a) (1966).

57.

The Land and Water Conservation Fund Act.

Pub. L.

88-578, § 2, Sep-

tember 3, 1964, 78 Stat. 897, amended Pub. L. 89-72, § 11, July 9, 1965,
79 Stat. 218, 16. U.S.C. § 460(1) -5 (1964). 43 C.F.R. §§ 18.1-.12 (1966).
58. 31 Fed. Reg. 251 (1966), amending 36 C.F.R. § 6.1 (b) (1966).
* During the past three years Mr. Hursh has served the National Park
Service as a Park Ranger (General) in Yellowstone National Park. In
this capacity he has investigated many personal injury cases arising
from non-motor vehicle accidents.
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in the scope of his employment, the defense of assumption
of risk is inapplicable if the risk is a concealed one. In such
a case the visitor will generally recover. In the determination of the duty to keep the premises reasonably safe, in the
context of the control of dangerous animals, the discretionary
function exclusion from liability becomes critical. The payment of an entrance fee is a critical issue; and if not required,
then by operation of Wyoming's exclusion of liability statute, the visitor has no status and the government's liability
is eliminated. When the visitor pays the entrance fee, in effect, he purchases invitee status with its attendant duty of
care; yet the visitors chances of recovery will remain limited
under the applicable Wyoming law.
JOHN R. HUESH*
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APPENDIX I
Tort Claims Filed as a Result of Incidents That Occurred
During the Calendar Year 1965 in Yellowstone National Park
No. of
Claims
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
3

Nature of Claim
Bear bite
Bear damage to tent and
other camping equipment
Bear damage to car
radio antenna
Person fell on Norris
Geyser Basin Trail
Person fell into Grand
Canyon of the Yellowstone
(death)
Person fell on the Old
Faithful Observation
Point Trail
Damage to employee's
personal equipment while
working
Government vehicles
involved in collision
with visitor vehicles
Private vehicles damaged,
miscellaneous

Amount
of Claim
$ 976.40

Status
Pending

$

320.00

Pending

$

3.58

Denied

$12,000.00

Pending

$ 2,484.52

Denied

$50,000.00

Pending

52.00

$

Denied

$ 1,177.04

4 - Allowed
1 - Denied

335.58

8 - Allowed

$

Tort Claims Filed as a Result of Incidents That Occurred
During the Calendar Year 1966 in Yellowstone National Park
No. of
Claims
1
1
2
2

Nature of Claim
Bear bite
Bear damage to trailer
Government vehicles
involved in collision
with other vehicles
Private vehicles damaged,
miscellaneous
Amount

of Claim
$108,830.69
165.00
$

Status
Pending
Pending

$

107.00

2 - Allowed

$

1,110.00

1 - Allowed
1 - Pending

All of the above claims have been legally filed through the proper channels.
Although there are fewer claims for 1966, it is often the case that claims from
incidents in past years will be forthcoming since the statute of limitations is three
years and is sometimes extended in certain circumstances. We anticipate at
least two additional claims will be filed from incidents occurring last year. A
request for claim forms has been received in both instances.
An analysis of reported injuries for 1966 other than motor vehicle accidents
has recently been completed. A total of 197 individual injuries indicated that the
major causes were falls and bear bites and scratches.
Falls
Bear Injuries
All Other

88
68
41

Total

197
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